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Abstract
Current power transitions in the context of China’s rise and US retrenchment have 
significantly conditioned the forms and effects of regional leadership across dif­
ferent world regions. Against this empirical background, this Special Issue gathers 
innovative conceptual and theoretical perspectives to study the links between re­
gional leadership and multipolarity in Europe, the Middle East, post-Soviet Eur­
asia, South America and South Asia. The introductory article provides a conceptual 
base for defining and explaing regional leadership and discusses the key arguments 
and findings of the individual articles.
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Introduction
The debate about how and why contemporary rising powers project their influ­
ence regionally, rooted in post-Cold War observations of power transitions, is in 
need of a review. W ith the potential strategic retreat of US leadership in some 
regions, the form and effectiveness of regional leadership projects will likely be 
tested more than ever in contemporary times. Available frameworks of regional 
leadership still insufficiently account for this scenario.
Most importantly, the concept of regional leadership is fragmented in the field 
of International Relations (IR) theory. First, scholars have added secondary con­
notations such as “cooperative”, “political” or “economic leadership” without first 
conceptualising leadership itself, thereby reducing conceptual clarity. Second,
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scholars have used the concept interchangeably with related terms such as “he­
gemony”, “primacy”, and “domination”. Third, linking both positive and negative 
connotations to regional leadership has charged the concept with different and 
partly diverging normative values.
This special issue of Rising Powers Quarterly seeks to mitigate some of these con­
ceptual shortcomings and contribute to our understanding of the evolving condi­
tions under which regional leadership operates by providing empirical perspec­
tives on power politics in Europe, the Middle East, post-Soviet Eurasia, South 
America and South Asia.
Conceptualizing Regional Leadership
To begin with, analyses of regional leadership in multipolar systems need to ac­
count for the complexity in which interactions between structures and actors are 
embedded. The most promising IR  scholarship has developed multidimensional 
concepts of regional leadership that reflect the possibility that power could in­
crease in one dimension and, at the same time, shrink in another. Baldwin (2002, 
pp.178-179) has inspired more recent analyses by outlining the key dimensions 
of regional leadership variation:
1. Scope. Referring to the possibility that an actor’s power might vary in dif­
ferent policy fields (economics, security).
2. Domain. Defining the size of an actor’s influence on others (regional, 
global).
3. Weight. Describing the reliability of an actor’s power (the chance to put 
one’s will into practice against the will of others).
4. Costs. Indicating the price an actor is willing and able to pay to achieve 
other actors’ compliance.
5. Means. Including symbolic, economic, military and diplomatic methods 
of exercising power.
States that play a regional leading role in the sense of rule making are also given 
special importance when the treatment of global problems is concerned. This ap­
plies to questions of global norm-building, world trade, and transnational security 
risks. Attempts to solving problems in these areas can be organised at the regional 
and global levels. In both cases some state actors play a more important role than 
others in the course of cooperation and negotiation processes and therefore have 
more influence on the results.
The reason for this could be the greater military or economic potential of these
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actors. Similarly, their legitimacy, diplomatic effectiveness, moral authority and 
representative function for a region or group of states might generate advantages 
in international bargaining. Depending on their relative power resources the re­
gional leaders choose different strategies in regional and international bargaining 
processes. The most promising leadership strategy that defines the foreign policy 
instruments applied by the regional powers can differ according to the systemic 
level (regional, global). A key objective of this special issue is to identify the for­
eign policy resources and instruments that regional powers apply under consider­
ation on different systemic levels.
W ith regard to the global level of analysis, the status of a regional leader implies 
that dominant actors of the international system accept this status. W hat is even 
more important is the degree to which regional powers manage to influence the 
global economic and security order. The degree of assertion of interests in global 
governance institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organi­
zation is supposed to serve as an indicator for power over outcomes.
A crucial reason for the declining but enduring US hegemony in international 
relations is its military supremacy. Washington still accounts for more than half 
of for global defense expenditures. In conventional military terms the US will 
remain the dominant global power for a long time. From a Realist perspective 
a multipolar system could be the results from the emergence of balancing coali­
tions against the global system’s dominant power by regional powers who suc­
cessfully achieved the position of the unipole in their regions (Wohlforth 1999, 
p.30). Linking this statement with the developing countries’ lack of power in 
the international system (measurable for instance in IM F voting power or per­
manent seats at the UN Security Council) multipolarisation becomes a priority 
foreign policy objective of developing states. In addition to forming balancing 
coalitions, these regional powers will likely seek to advance the transformation 
toward multipolarity by increasing their influence in international institutions. 
In particular, the governments of Southern states that have the capacity to build 
regional unipolarities,must be interested in finding an effective way to challenge 
the current international hierarchy and to transform themselves into power poles 
of a future multipolar system. One way to project significant global influence 
(decision-maker status) is by consolidation regional powerhood as a base for pur­
suing national interests in the multipolar order.
In other words, rising powers need to determine which role they seek to play in 
their respective regions and whether they are willing to bear the cost of regional 
leadership before defining their global policy and status goals. W ith the excep­
tion of Russia, which is the only case under consideration that is permanant UN 
Securiy Council member, all articles in this special issue deal with global-level 
middle powers instead of great powers on the global stage. As Cox (1996, p.241)
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has suggested, “the middle-power role is not a fixed universal” but a concept and 
set of practices that continually evolve in search of different forms of actomess. 
I f  sharing some similar characteristics on the need for rules and order in multi­
lateral institutions, middle powers differ significantly on their regional roles such 
as pursuing divergent preferences on the regions direction and pathes of regional 
institutionalisation.
W ith regard to the (intra)regional level of analysis, the degree of coordination, 
formalisation and institutionalisation of trade and security policies is an indicator 
of the quality of the intraregional cooperation. In addition to free trade agree­
ments, bilateral and multilateral measures in the sectors infrastructure, technology 
and energy are included in the investigation. The mutual transparency between 
the states in key areas such as defence planning, arms trade and military budget 
indicates the degree of confidence building between the neighbouring countries, 
and transnational threats can encourage the creation of cooperative security poli­
cies in the investigated regions. In particular, non-military security challenges 
imply direct threats to the states: drug trafficking and arms trade as well as money 
laundering as forms of organised crime, activities by guerrilla organisations across 
the national borders, transnational terrorism and the proliferation of means of 
mass destruction. On the contrary, it is possible that the regional power itself 
poses a regional threat or is perceived as such.
Considering these observations, the case selection of this special issue is based 
on the following definition of regional powerhood. As suggested by Fiemes and 
Nolte (2010, p.23), a regional power
1. Is part of a geographically delimited region;
2. Is ready to assume leadership;
3. Displays the necessary material and ideational capabilities for regional 
power projection; and
4. Is highly influential in regional affairs.
Conceivable further criteria for distinguishing and classifying different types of 
regional powers are
1. Economic, political and cultural interconnectedness of the regional power 
within its region;
2. The provision of collective goods for the region;
3. The existence of an ideational leadership project; and
10
Rethinking Regional Leadership in the Global Disorder
4. The acceptance of the leadership by potential followers.
We argue that Brazil, Colombia, Germany, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia fulfil 
at least the four basic criteria of regional powerhood.
Explaining Regional Leadership
This special issue aims to develop novel approaches to analysing and modelling 
the foreign policies of regional powers in the multipolar system. More specifically, 
the authors present innovative concepts from different theoretical perspectives to 
explain and manage the complex challenges related to regional leadership. Each 
article outlines a particular theoretical lens and applies it to a world region that 
is distinct from the others by a particular power structure and politics, culture of 
interaction and domestic system. We invited analyses from two main theoretical 
camps that have generated the most inspiring contributions to the debates on 
regional leadership and multipolarity over the past decade: (Neo)Realism and 
Constructivism. Both grand theories have constantly been complemented and 
developed further. Each of the six articles of this special issue outlines a particular 
theoretical lens and applies it to a world region that is distinguished from others 
by a particular power structure and politics, culture of interaction or domestic 
system.
Rethinking Realist Perspectives
Realist perspectives on leadership are often associated with the concepts of power 
and/or hegemony. However, both concepts are strongly contested in the literature. 
Classical Realists depict international cooperation as “a necessary function of the 
balance of power operating in a multiple state system” (Morgenthau 1967: 175). 
For those traditional Realists, international institutions are always a function of 
state power and interests. Neorealism assumes that states ally to balance against 
the superior power capabilities of other states. Power capabilities are the deter­
mining factor of states’ choices (Waltz 1979). I t has been common for Neorealists 
to use the term ‘hegemony’ as a synonym for dominance or disproportionately 
preponderant capabilities (Waltz 1979). I t would be rational for a hegemon to use 
its preponderant power in the interest of the system as a whole, because his power 
only exists relative to the systemic context in which it is embedded.
Three of the special issue’s contributions engage with variations of (N eo rea l­
ism: First, Alcides Costa Vaz (University of Brasilia) examines regional leader­
ship in South America. In the past 10 years of IR scholarship, South America’s 
... viewed through the prism of Brazil’s rise as the region’s primary rising power 
and its potential function as a bridge between aspiring and established powers 
(e.g., Burges 2016). Brazil, which is South America’s largest country in terms of 
population, territory, GDP and defence expenditures, has experienced sustained
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high economic growth since 2002 and has become the eight largest economy by 
GD P in 2017. Gradually, Brasilia raised its regional and global diplomatic profile, 
increasingly vocally claiming a permanent seat at the United Nations Security 
Council, pushing for reforms in the international financial institutions and taking 
a proactive stance in new institutions such as the G20, the BRICS and the IBSA 
forum. A key novelty was Brazil’s emergence as an informal spokesperson for 
both South America and the emerging world order (Rachman 2017). In this role, 
Brazil pursued varying forms of “concertación” (literally concertation) (Merke 
2015) or consensual and cooperative hegemony (Burges 2015) that were per­
ceived favourably or met with modest soft and institutional balancing by South 
American neighbours (Fiemes &W ehner 2015).
However, a series of recent crises has severely challenged overly optimistic depic­
tions of Brazil’s trajectory as a pivotal regional leader and aspiring great power. 
Brazil’s economy has suffered a huge recession that has combined weak growth 
with high deficits, and low investments, and its state plunged into a political cri­
sis following corruption scandals that engulfed the political and business elite. 
Costa Vaz (University of Brasilia) puts this situation into perspective by adopting 
the analytical framework of “restraint” developed by Brent J. Steele and Barry 
Posen to assess the prospects of Brazil’s regional leadership after the Workers 
Party (PT) era. Steele and Posen understand restraint as a merger of selective 
engagement and isolationism. Since taking office in 2016, Brazil’s President M i­
chel Temer has sought to reinvigorate the state’s foreign policy, but his efforts 
have been severely constrained by domestic political and ideological polarisation 
on one hand and regional political and economic fragmentation on the other. 
Thus, domestic and regional constraints have thus contributed to a shift towards 
restraint as a constitutive feature of Brazil’s foreign policy. Again, the waning role 
of the US as a semi-engaged hegemon and the increasing footprint of China in 
South America are likely to create conditions to which Brazil’s restraint will have 
to adapt in the future.
Second, Nicolas Blarel (Leiden University) and Hannes Ebert (GIGA Institute 
of Asian Studies) assess India’s regional leadership in South Asia. India is a par­
ticularly instructive case for studying the ambivalences in the linkages between 
regional leadership and global aspirations. While successive governments partly 
succeeded in reinventing India’s global role after the end of the Cold War, in­
creasing its voice in international institutions and enhancing its strategic ties with 
multiple regional and great powers such as the US, their efforts to garner regional 
followership were lukewarm and overall ineffective (Ganguly 2018). In particular, 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, redressed New Delhi’s efforts to break 
the deadlock in South Asian cooperation when coming into office in 2014. The 
government took steps to aggressively defend India’s proclaimed dominant role
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in the region against the never-ending opposition of its enduring rival Pakistan, 
rising Chinese investments and influence in South Asia, and growing national­
ism tied to anti-Indian sentiments in states such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka (Jaishankar 2016). This included emphasising South Asian but also wider 
Indo-Pacific regionalism (Pant 2017). IR  scholarship on regional leadership still 
struggles to adequately account for the arduous transformation of India’s South 
Asia policies (Ebert &  Blarel 2018).
Against this background, Blarel and Ebert observe that Realist and Liberalist ex­
pectations on the effects of a unipolar regional distribution of power capabilities 
in South Asia have not materialised. Attempts by the Indian state to establish a 
stable order through coercive or deterrent force or generate followership through 
institutions and public goods provision failed, and high levels of interstate vio­
lence and low levels of regional integration persist in the region. This is puzzling 
given that India has enjoyed overwhelming superiority of conventional power 
capabilities in the region since its independence in 1947 and, in particular, since 
Pakistan’s breakup in 1971. Blarel and Ebert suggest that leadership in the region 
is profoundly conditioned by the social interactions between leader and potential 
followers of the South Asian post-Cold War order. As a first step of building a 
contextualised understanding of leadership, both authors refer to English School 
conceptualisations of hegemony that propose constructing regional leadership 
through observations of the social interactions associated with the primary pow­
er’s expected regional roles and responsibilities. By tracing India’s regional leader­
ship roles and responsibilities in a set of interactions during Indo-Pakistani crises 
in the post-Cold War, Blarel and Ebert conclude that the Indian state is still 
searching an effective strategy to adopt to a two-decades-old context: the pres­
ence of nuclear weapons and non-state militants, used by South Asia’s secondary 
power Pakistan to prevent at all costs India’s regional dominance.
Finally, through their analysis of distinct dyadic military crises, the authors dem­
onstrate that India’s traditional deterrence doctrine has failed to dissuade non­
state militants from engaging in asymmetric attacks against India’s symbols of 
leadership such as its political capital Delhi and its commercial centre Mumbai. 
Thus, in an attempt to adapt to this context, New Delhi sought to reform its 
deterrence toolkit and revive its military deterrence capacities’ credibility as a pre­
condition for effective leadership, devising military options such as the public 
re-branding of cross-border firing as “surgical strikes” to efficiently target militant 
groups and other forms of coercive diplomacy. However, this transformation is 
ongoing and is far from terminated. Thus far, the conventionally more powerful 
state has felt compelled to limit its ambitions and install new mechanisms for 
credible deterrence. Thus, Blarel and Ebert suggest that IR scholarship should 
further investigate the ways in which non-state actors in a nuclearised rivalry
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context truncate the stabilising effects of unipolar regional systems.
Third, Anna Sunik (Heidelberg University) analyzes Saudi Arabia’s leadership 
aspirations in the Middle East. The Middle East has not featured prominently in 
the IR  study of regional leadership and multipolarity, partly because of the lack of 
one precipitously rising power with rapid high economic growth and increasing 
global clout (Fawcett 2013). Even before the so-called Arab uprisings that began 
in 2010, observers argued that the Middle Eastern regional order was broken 
(Salem 2008). Structures and power balances established in the late 1970s and 
amended since the end of the Cold War eroded with the collapse of Iraq as a 
centralised sovereign state and the cessation of its function as a buffer between 
the aspiring regional powers Iran and Turkey. Today, 15 years after the US in­
vasion of Iraq, aspiring states militarily escalate their claims in multiple proxy 
conflicts and civil wars. Having sensed waning US commitment to the Middle 
East, whose military capabilities in the region had outweighed those of all other 
regional states, contenders for leadership - including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates - have jostled for influence and status to 
promote their diverging economic, ideological, nationalistic and sectarian agen­
das (cp. Cook, Stokes &  Brock 2014).
However, the fact that “the Middle East features for not having produced a re­
gional power” (Beck 2014, p.2) does not mean that understanding international 
politics in the region through the lens of regional leadership would not yield 
value. In contrast, the current transformations of regional order in the Middle 
East require us to update and refine our interpretations of the past and pro­
spective structural parameters. Against this background, Sunik examines Saudi 
Arabia’s new interventionism as part of its leadership bid in the Middle East as 
exemplified in its intervention in Yemen. To date, Saudi Arabia has been able to 
mitigate conventional military disadvantages vis-â-vis Iran by capitalising on its 
greater wealth (“riyalpolitik”) and close alliance with the US. Since 2011, Saudi 
Arabia not only ramped up its defense spending but also intensified its regional 
foreign policy activities, participating in the coalition against the so-called “Is­
lamic State”, engaging in Bahrain, supporting anti-government rebels in Syria, 
building a multilateral coalition to fight terrorism, and со-initiating a pro-longed 
military intervention in Yemen. The last of these actions, initiated in March 2015, 
is particularly noteworthy as it was the first full-scale military operation by Saudi 
Arabia and its partners exclusively under regional leadership.
Sunik demonstrates that this resurgence has been driven by a combination of 
power-driven balance-of-threat impulses and regime security considerations 
linked to identity issues that construct Iran as a threat to domestic stability, as ex­
tent studies on “omnibalancing” rightly revealed. In particular, the power vacuum 
that ensued US withdrawal compelled the kingdom to step up its efforts to inde-
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pendendy guarantee its regional interests. After the collapse of Iraq, the hitherto 
tripolar Persian Gulf system transformed broadly into a bipolar struggle with 
Iran, only exacerbated by the post-2011 turmoil. While “omnibalancing” explana­
tions sufficiendy uncover this dynamic, they fail to account for the specific shape 
(multilateral “coalition of the willing”) and location (Yemen instead of Syria) of 
the intervention. To fill this gap, Sunik draws on the scholarship on authoritar­
ian institutions and their symbolic functions. Authoritarian states form alliances 
not just to provide security but also to build reputation and prestige. From this 
perspective, Sunik finds that the kingdom intervened multilaterally in Yemen to 
signal ability, resolve and commitment to replace US dominance in the region 
and thereby foster its claim for broader regional leadership. Thus, by combin­
ing domestic and systemic drivers of regional leadership, Sunik highlights how 
potential regional powers feel compelled or willing to expand their traditional 
foreign policy toolbox in order to adopt to novel regional opportunity structures 
in the transition toward global multipolarity. Again, whether Riyadh’s signalling 
of regional leadership resolve garners sufficient followership to back-up its claims 
remains an open empirical question.
Rethinking Constructivist Perspectives
The status of a regional power is also a social category and therefore depends not at 
least on the acceptance of this status, and the associated social hierarchy, by others. 
Thus, it is important to include the role conceptions, ideas, norms and perceptions 
in the discussion on regional leadership and global disorder. Social interactions 
can have transformative effects on the interests and identities of state actors and 
their continuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjective meanings. Ef­
fectively formulating and implementing a consensual idea-driven regional project 
could help regional powers to enhance legitimacy of their leadership role. An 
ideational leadership project as such aims at producing common norms and ideas 
among the regional states. Three of the special issue’s contributions engage with 
variations of Constructivist thinking:
The first is Hanns W. Maull’s (German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs) analysis of Germany’s leadership role in Europe. Again, Europe is not 
among the “usual suspects” of regions discussed in IR  scholarship on regional 
leadership and multipolarity. From the view of regional power politics, Europe 
is first and foremost home to established powers, two of which, France and the 
UK, are nuclear states with a permanent seat in the United Nations Security 
Council. Recent debates have focused on Germany’s growing power capabili­
ties and diplomatic influence, examining how that country’s rising regional and 
global ambitions will shape and be shaped by what is still a multipolar European 
system and the evolving global order. Amidst recent calls to become “more active” 
in solving the multiple simultaneous crises in and beyond Europe, some observers
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concluded that the 21й century’s second decade is Germany’s ‘unipolar moment’ 
in Europe (Brattberg &  De Lima 2015) and the ‘German moment in a fragile 
world’ (Bagger 2015). A consensus has emerged that Germany has shifted from 
Europe’s ‘sick man’ in the early 20th century to being its leading economic power­
house, driven by a chancellor with international acclaim, a public attractiveness as 
the ‘most popular country’ (Chokshi 2016), and the football World Champion, as 
well as its peers’ relative weaknesses.
However, the hegemonic traits of Germany’s position in the evolving European 
hierarchy of power have been subject to heated debate (cp. Harnisch 2014; Fiem­
es &  Ebert 2017). While some contended that “the world waits for Germany” 
(Blyth &  Matthijs 2012), that “Germany must lead or leave [the euro]” (Soros 
2012), that “Germany is a great power” and “should act like one” (Burrows &  
Gnad 2016), and that Germany in the context of the refugee crisis has evolved 
as the world’s “new can-do nation” (Cohen 2015) and as “enforcer, facilitator and 
benefactor in Europe’s triple crisis” (Matthijs 2016, p.135), other commentators 
have stressed the limits of German power (Kleine-Brockhoff &  Maull 2011; 
Perthes 2016), framing its position and policies in terms of “contested hegemony” 
(Jürgens 2013), “semi hegemony” (Kundnani 2014) or “reluctant hegemony” (Pa­
terson 2011; Bunde &. Oroz 2015; Kornelius 2015) and discrediting Germany’s 
acclaimed ‘unipolar moment’ as a “myth” (Schwarzer &  Lang 2012; Nicholson 
2015). Historical Institutionalist analyses of Germany’s emerging international 
role have highlighted the country’s structural embeddedness in Europe (Craw­
ford 2007; Bulmer 2013). Realist analyses, meanwhile, have argued that Germa­
ny’s political leadership has tangibly strived for a more autonomous, power-based, 
unilateralist foreign policy (Hellmann 2011).
Maull engages with this debate by drawing the evolving German leadership sta­
tus in Europe through the lens of role theory drawing on the civilian power ap­
proach. Domestic and regional pressures have compelled the German state to 
significantly adjust both its “ego” and “alter” components of its foreign policy role 
concept, that is, the expectations regarding its role by itself and by others. Role 
theory postulates that these normative expectations have the power to shape 
foreign policy behavior. A t the domestic level, the emergence of a right-wing 
populist party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) constituted the first impactful 
challenge to Germany’s traditional pro-European policies. A t the regional level, 
multiple crises related to socio-economic challenges in some Eurozone states, mi­
gration, and the Ukraine conflict brought Germany into a position of a broker of 
a common European or even Western positions. Maull illustrates how through­
out these crises, Berlin was preoccupied with reconciling internal and external 
expectations regarding its expected role, which have become increasingly diverse 
and contradictory. Except during the Eurozone crisis, where German leadership
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was forceful and sing-minded, Berlin has managed to gamer support for a man­
agement mode of “leadership from behind”, which remained relatively close its 
traditional civilian power role concept, although this continuity might become 
increasingly contested both from within and abroad in the future.
Eduardo Pastrana and Diego Vera (Javeriana University) offer a second refine­
ment of Constructivist thinking on regional leadership in an era of evolving mul­
tipolarity. Their contribution draws attention to a sub-region that has not been 
substantially studied from a regional leadership perspective: Central America and 
the Caribbean and the Pacific Alliance. Thus far, IR  scholarship on the region has 
focused on intrastate violence, its regional and international repercussions, and 
the role of extra-regional states as conflict mediators. Scholarship failed to notice 
that in the context of a transition from civil war to peace, the Colombian state has 
cautiously sought ways to envision and play a role of regional leader in the region.
From a theoretical angle similar to that of Maull, Pastrana and Vera explore the 
leadership role of post-conflict Colombia in the Caribbean Basin and the Pacific 
Alliance. They frame the new role conception of the Colombian foreign policy by 
adopting the concepts of functional leadership and niche diplomacy. In President 
Juan Manuel Santos’s two terms in power since 2010, Colombia sought to expand 
its foreign policy previously focused on narrow trade and security concerns and 
increase its influence in the region through so-called South-South Cooperation 
and Triangular Cooperation. Bogota has sought to step up its contribution to 
conflict resolution and knowledge transfer. Pastrana and Vera conclude that, in 
doing so, it has paved the way for thematic and geographical niche diplomacy as 
a form of Colombian leadership.
Finally, Regina Heller’s (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy) explo­
ration of Russia’s leadership in post-Soviet Eurasia provides a third Constructiv­
ist-inspired perspective on regional leadership. One of the developments that has 
most exigendy revealed the need to rethink some of IR’s dominant power politics 
propositions is Russia’s recent efforts to redress the stark decline in its presence 
in post-Soviet Eurasia. Scholars and policy-makers have debated Russia’s creden­
tials as the predominant power in the region and self-proclaimed status as a great 
power (MacFarlane 2018). While the country’s military prowess and political 
influence make it a key global player, its weakening economy has sparked doubts 
about the sustainability of its aspirations, and growing opposition to its regional 
initiatives even by some of its traditional regional allies such as Kazakhstan and 
Armenia following the annexation of Crimea have challenged Russia’s claims for 
leadership (Meister 2018). W ith the 2013-2014 crisis in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s 
fixation with great power status and with the West as an “object of emulation or as 
a defining other” (Wilson 2017,p.l9) has become even more linked to its ongoing 
national identity construction and domestic legitimation.
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Regina Heller engages with social psychology and emotions research in IR  to 
trace the drivers of Russia’s regional leadership in post-Soviet Eurasia, exempli­
fied by its recent foreign policy towards Ukraine. From the outset, Heller chal­
lenges dominant Realist approaches to explain Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
and interference in Eastern Ukraine with exclusive reference to power politics 
considerations. Contrary to these approaches, Moscow’s Ukraine policy has not 
exclusively - and not even predominantly - been driven by the objective to maxi­
mise its relative power position and influence in the region by occupying strategic 
locations and coercing post-Soviet states into submission. How else, Heller asks, 
would these approaches account for the observation that Russia has overall lost 
influence over the country and the overall region and compromised its principled 
defence of the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Rather, Russia’s 
Ukraine policy and by extension its leadership aspirations toward the post-Soviet 
region has primarily been driven by the urge for social recognition as a regional 
leader. Russia is willing to restore its status even at the risk of losing influence.
Based on a social psychology perspective, Heller analyses the official Russian dis­
course in the Ukraine crisis to trace the process in which unresolved behavioural 
and cognitive anger over Russia’s perceived status deprivation as well as unfair, 
unreliable and humiliating treatment by the West in the context of the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution has driven Moscow’s regional policies. Under Russian Presi­
dent Vladimir Putin, the attempt to establish regional primacy in the post-Soviet 
Eurasia has become increasingly linked to efforts to construct a collective identity 
in which Russia is a central and equal entity in a global order that has so far 
been dominated by the West. By illustrating the core signifiers in this conception, 
Heller’s article exhibits how in a period of power transitions the aspirations for re­
gional hegemony are linked to social status seeking in the global order. However, 
in post-Soviet Eurasia it remains unclear whether the strategic use of moral jus­
tifications of aggressive foreign policy behaviour will suffice to not only increase 
domestic legitimation but also establish regional leadership.
Together, these articles represent empirical and analytical refinements of IR  de­
bates on regional leadership and multipolarity. All of the assessments highlight 
the need to take stock of the considerable geopolitical changes related to the rise 
of China and the evolving retrenchment of the US, and to assess the domestic 
pressures related to the upsurge of nationalist and populist politics -  macro chal­
lenges to leadership across regions that will certainly further occupy future IR 
scholarship.
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